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Does Policy Learning Meet the Standards of an
Analytical Framework of the Policy Process?
Claire A. Dunlop and Claudio M. Radaelli
Reference to policy learning is commonplace in the public policy literature but the question of whether
it qualifies as an analytical framework applicable to the policy process has yet to be systematically
addressed. We therefore appraise learning as analytical framework in relation to four standards:
assumptions and micro-foundations, conceptual apparatus, observable implications, normative
applications. We find that policy learning meets the four standards, although its theoretical leverage
varies across them. Since we are not aware of theories of the policy process that meet all of these
standards all the time, we conclude that policy learning fares reasonably well and it’s worth investing
intellectual resources in this field.
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政策学习能否作为政策过程的分析框架？
在公共政策文献中时常见到政策学习的参考资料, 但这样的参考资料是否能成为合格的分析框
架, 应用于政策过程呢？这是还需要进行系统处理的问题。因此, 作者以四个标准评价了作为
分析框架的政策学习。四个标准分别是：假设和微观基础、概念工具、可见的意义/影响, 以及
规范性应用。作者发现, 政策学习达到了这四项标准, 尽管其在各项标准中的理论影响有所不
同。由于本文并未发现能在任何时候都达到这些标准的政策过程理论,结论认为,政策学习是
相当成功的,并且值得对此领域投资智力资源。
关键词：解释, 政策学习, 因果关系, 公共政策, 政策过程理论
>El aprendizaje polıtico cumple con los estandares de un marco analıtico en el proceso
polıtico?
La referencia al aprendizaje polıtico es comun en la literatura de la polıtica publica, pero el
interrogante de si esto califica como un marco analıtico que se puede aplicar al proceso polıtico
todavıa tiene que ser sistematicamente abordado. Entonces evaluamos el aprendizaje como un marco
analıtico en relacion con cuatro estandares: las suposiciones y las micro fundaciones; los aparatos
conceptuales; las implicaciones observables; las aplicaciones normativas. Hallamos que el aprendizaje
polıtico cumple con los cuatro estandares, pero su ventaja teorica varıa entre ellos. Ya que no estamos
conscientes de teorıas del proceso polıtico que cumplan con todos estos estandares todo el tiempo,
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concluimos que el aprendizaje polıtico se defiende razonablemente bien y tiene valor de inversion y
recursos de inteligencia en este campo.
Palabras clave: explicacion, aprendizaje polıtico, causalidad, polıticas publicas, teorıas del proceso
polıtico
Introduction and Motivation
Learning and its link to beliefs, policy development, and change is a central
theme of public policy analysis. A recent review of the field found nearly one
thousand political science articles dealing with topics of policy learning (Dunlop
& Radaelli, 2013). In a recent version of the classic Theories of the Policy Process
(Sabatier & Weible, 2014), learning as a causal mechanism is associated with most
of the major policy frameworks outlined in the volume. We have found the causal-
ity of collective learning (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 13, see also Heikkila & Ger-
lak, 2013), organizational learning within the multiple streams framework
(Zahariadis, 2014, p. 44), policy-oriented learning affecting social constructions in
the context of the advocacy coalitions framework (Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Wei-
ble, & Sabatier, 2014, p. 198), learning as a mechanism of policy diffusion (Berry &
Berry, 2014, pp. 310–311), and learning as a meso-theory adopted by the narrative
policy framework (NPF) (Jones, Shanahan, & McBeth, 2014, p. 131). Since 2009,
there have been five special issues devoted to learning in public policy journals—
two on diffusion and transfer (Dolowitz, 2009; Evans, 2009, respectively); one on
the EU as a learning organization (Zito & Schout, 2009); another on learning and
policy failure (Dunlop, 2017a); a volume on policy change (Moyson, Scholten, &
Weible, 2017) and another edited volume on modes and outcomes of policy learn-
ing (Dunlop, Radaelli & Trein, 2018)—all underpinned by international conference
panels and workshops. In a nutshell, this is a growth field.
Given this interest, we raise the question of whether learning meets the stand-
ards of an analytical framework of the policy process. Our contribution to the litera-
ture is innovative because policy learning is either treated as a mechanism that
supports other explanations or frameworks, or falls in the evaluation stage of the
heuristic policy cycle (e.g., Araral, Fritzen, Howlett, Ramesh, & Wu, 2013). But in the
literature, policy learning is not yet considered an analytical lens, as shown by its
absence in all editions of Theories of the Policy Process, the advanced text pioneered by
Paul Sabatier (Sabatier, 1999).
To answer our question, let us consider what a framework for the analysis of the
policy process or lens “does.” Before we do that, let us bear in mind the distinction
between theory and analytical framework (Carlsson, 2017; Dowding, 1995; George &
Bennett, 2004, pp. 115–117; Stanley, 2012). Analytical frameworks contain simplifying
ontological assumptions that are useful to understand the world and are applicable
to a variety of research questions and contexts. Assumptions about learning should
not be judged by their precision to reflect and match the world, but on how convinc-
ing and useful they are to categorize and reduce complexity—and to address certain
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research questions. The assumptions are stronger if they are derived from a theory,
for example a theory of beliefs or a theory of the mind. Frameworks go beyond
assumptions. They are used to generate and construct explanations or theoretical
propositions (Stanley, 2012, p. 476), to normatively appraise a given phenomenon,
and so on—but they are distinct from theories.
Theories explain and possibly predict a given reality, account for variance across
their units and similarity in patterns, and finally allow us to generalize. We rehearse
these points because the volume Theories of the Policy Process (Sabatier & Weible,
2014) actually contains “frameworks” as shown by the very label put on the advo-
cacy coalitions framework (chapter 6), the narrative policy framework (chapter 7),
the institutional analysis and development framework (chapter 8), and the multiple
streams approach (chapter 2).
In policy analysis there is a shared understanding of what a framework should
do, based on four criteria (Birchfield, 2013; Sabatier, 2007, p. 8; Zahariadis, 2013): (1)
it should provide clear assumptions grounded in theory; (2) its concepts should
have internal consistency and the main propositions should provide explanatory
leverage; (3) it should contain observable implications—here is where the frame-
work connects with theoretical propositions that can be tested; and (4) it should lead
to normative appraisals of public policy, connecting the framework to democratic
governance and reform.
We should be clear, none of the frameworks contained in Theories of the Policy
Process is a total explainer. Indeed, we often hear that a multiple framework
approach is better, whereby different perspectives can be layered to create wide
explanations (Cairney & Heikkila, 2014). Granted that no framework can make
claims to total and unique explanations, how does policy learning fare in relation to
the four criteria?
A cursory overview of the field suggests a negative answer. Most articles rou-
tinely (and rightly) list the seminal work of Deutsch (1966), Lindblom (1965), and
Heclo (1974). This is not simply giving due deference to the giants of our field, but
also makes the point that very little has been built in terms of analytical framework
in the intervening decades. Rather, policy learning is dominated by empirics some-
times organized around typologies (most obviously Bennett & Howlett, 1992, and
May, 1992).
In the next section we review recent advances in the field, pointing to a set
of concepts that is relevant for our discussion. The following sections examine
the criteria to benchmark analytical frameworks, and the final section provides
an answer to whether learning matches these criteria and where we go next.
Throughout the article, we keep a focus on learning in the policy process,
although we acknowledge that policy learning exists beyond the boundaries of
the policy process.
Looking for Conceptual Foundations to Build the Learning Framework
In recent years, political scientists began to look at learning again. Two sets of
authors in particular have pushed the agenda—Heikkila and Gerlak (2013) on
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collective learning and Dunlop and Radaelli’s (2013) varieties of learning. Here we
focus on the model of varieties of learning. Heikkila and Gerlak (2013) provide a
schema to distinguish between three elements: (1) where learning takes place—actor
or system level; (2) the process and products of learning; and (3) within-learning pro-
cesses, between the acquisition of information, translation, and dissemination. This
approach has a good deal of merit. It is a valuable way to break down learning into
the three elements. In this contribution we do not have space to reflect on more than
one approach, however. This time we opt for Dunlop and Radaelli’s (2013) varieties
of learning approach because it systematizes a large body of literature and suggests a
congenial way to build an analytical framework. The authors carried out a biblio-
graphic search, identifying an initial population of 833 articles on policy learning.
After excluding duplicates, articles that refer to learning in purely descriptive ways
and, entirely normative articles on “more” and “better” learning (see Dunlop &
Radaelli, 2013, p. 616, footnote 2), their study explores in depth 83 articles that engage
with learning as an analytical framework. On the basis of this sample, they identify
two dimensions that map out the field into four main learning types. They then
decompose the two-by-two space into sixteen subtypes. Contrary to other typological
exercises, theirs draws explicitly on the method of explanatory typologies—a method
that allows researchers to be clear about the causal architecture of their model (Elman,
2005). Thus, their typology is explanatory instead of descriptive—with learning types
being the dependent variable that falls into the various cells of the types.
The full account of varieties of learning can be found in Dunlop and Radaelli
(2013), but let us recall the essentials. Systematization of the policy learning literature
in political science reveals four different learning processes, or modes, which recur
empirically: epistemic, reflexive, bargaining, and hierarchical. These main learning
modes are the product of two conditions associated with policymaking environ-
ments: the level of tractability and certification of actors associated with an issue. Next,
to expand the property space to 16, they consider the variables of learners’ control
over the objectives of learning (high or low) and the learners’ control over the content
and means of learning (high or low). We outline this in the next section.
For the moment, let us stay within the two-by-two space of the higher-level (of
abstraction) typology, looking at tractability of the policy problem (Jenkins-Smith,
1990) and social certification of actors (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). Tractability,
and its opposite (radical uncertainty), is prominent in the analysis of learning in sys-
tems of risk assessment, highly technical domains of environmental policy, policy
instruments like regulatory impact assessment, and the social contestation of science.
The point is simple: given high tractability, elected politicians and bureaucracies can
define the pay-offs associated with different courses of action. At the opposite, high
or even radical uncertainty leads to reliance on epistemic communities, experts, and
technical policy instruments. But, this variable is not limited to actors: it also refers to
the forum or institutional setting of learning because highly tractable problems lend
themselves quite naturally to standard operating procedures, technical fora, or dele-
gation to independent regulatory agencies.
The second dimension of variation across the literature is about who, in a given
policy sector during a certain period, is socially certified as a teacher. This can be a
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central bank, an elected politician, or a nongovernmental organization like Amnesty
International. Social certification can also direct toward specific institutional solu-
tions, like a parliamentary committee or an inquiry. In short, certification concerns
the extent to which a socially endorsed group or organization exists and has a seat at
the policymaking table. In the absence of a privileged actor, learning participants
will be plural—composed of a range of interested actors or of wider society itself.
Taken together, levels of issue tractability and actor certification provide the axes for
four types of policy learning to vary (see Figure 1).
This approach moves us beyond binary thinking. Its research questions are more
fine-grained than the presence or absence of learning. They are about the identifica-
tion of a given type of learning, and whether over the course of time a policy sub-
system moves from one learning mode to another. The independent variables are
dynamic—the level of issue tractability or actor certification adjusts to external devel-
opments and internal learning processes. Thus, the pre-eminent mode of learning is
in flux—over time, who creates the lessons that matter and the content of that learn-
ing will change. Finally, there are questions about whether an organization or a pol-
icy subsystem learns in the wrong mode, that is, dysfunctionally.
This way of mapping the literature is a promising start for tackling our research
question about the status of policy learning. Establishing this status, however,
requires a research design architecture able to account for causal relationships. And
so, we move on to examine the criteria that an analytical framework should match.
Clear Assumptions and Micro-Foundations
To begin with, assumptions must be clear and grounded in theory. Without
these, we have no axioms on which to build and are in danger of relying on common
2. Reflexive Learning 3. Learning through Bargaining 
1. Epistemic Learning 4. Learning in the Shadow of 
Hierarchy 
LOW 
LOW 
CERTIFICATION 
OF ACTORS
HIGH 
HIGH 
PROBLEM TRACTABILITY 
Figure 1. Conceptualizing Modes of Policy Learning.
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sense rather than scientific strategies (Sabatier, 2007, p. 5). Given the scale of the liter-
ature, we need a minimal definition of policy learning. Let us start from learning as
an updating of beliefs about public policy. This matches the central concern of all
policy analysis—the study of how beliefs inform policy debates; content; perfor-
mance; institutional structures; and, on occasion, change. Beliefs are updated
through social interaction, appraisals of one’s experience or evidence-based analysis,
or most likely a mix of the three.
Yet, we are getting ahead of ourselves. What are the ontological assumptions
that underpin this definition of learning and where do they come from? What are
the micro-foundations of policy learning? We need a micro-level model of the indi-
vidual that anchors our understanding of who learns, how, and with what effect.
Here we enter the debate on micro-foundations. This debate is played out in the ter-
ritory of varieties of homo economicus or types of rationality—full or bounded.
Recently, we have heard of homo narrans in the context of the narrative policy frame-
work (NPF) (Jones & McBeth, 2010; Jones et al., 2014; Shanahan, Jones, McBeth, &
Radaelli, 2018). Although the homo economicus can accommodate some types of learn-
ing, for example in game theory, this is a straightjacket: we need to identify a type of
micro-foundation sensitive to the vision of humans as sentient beings. Within learn-
ing as framework, homo discentis—the learning, studying, and practicing person—is
at the heart of all policymaking. No matter what policy environment we operate in,
what our role or standpoint, whether we work alone or in a collective, learning is the
governing logic of action. Learning is how people make sense of the world.
The homo discentis vision of the individual is rooted in behavioral theories of psy-
chology and adult education (Mocker & Spear, 1982; Rogers, 2002). We can think of
this human as the composite of two sides. First, we have the homo cognoscentis. Our
minds are full of prior knowledge, this knowledge is based on experiences, formal
learning, intuitions, and values. These knowings are in a constant state of flux. We
update and modify our beliefs as new information arrives. In line with the ground-
breaking work on belief systems in political science by Haas (1990), Hall (1993), Saba-
tier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) and Muller (2000), these beliefs are of different types
and have different degrees of resistance to change. For those beliefs most permeable
to change, we do this on the basis of probability calculations—so-called Bayesian rea-
soning—where we estimate the likelihood, or impact, of an event based on contex-
tual conditions that we think are related to that event. Our second side is homo
doctrinis—armed with these priors and updates we teach each other most frequently
through argument or rhetoric; socialization; and, in some cases, coercion. Again, role
and style of teaching are contextually contingent.
Yet, we do not assume that this updating is efficient or results in “correct” learn-
ing outcomes; far from it. When we update our knowledge and arguments—i.e., our
learning—we do so on the basis of fragmented and incomplete information and with
imperfect cognitive capacity (Jones, 2001). Uncertainty and complexity in the policy-
making environment and our own analytical limitations are the founding conditions
of a world of “bounded rationality” (Simon, 1947, 1957). The goal here is to learn in
ways that help us “satisfice” (Simon, 1956)—use what we know to find satisfactory
solutions, given the limitations of the real world. In this view, the definition and
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understanding of policy problems is epistemically developmental and so temporally
contingent. Thus, what we learn is inevitability fragile and filtered through
“heuristics” or cognitive shortcuts that fill the void left by uncertainty (Jones, 2001;
Kahneman, 2011). In his seminal text The Art of Judgment (1965), Vickers puts it thus:
“[F]acts are relevant only in relation to some judgments of value and judgments of
value are operative only in relation to some configuration of fact” (1965, p. 40). Policy
action is a product of actors’ judgments of their contextual reality and the cognitive
biases they hold. Understanding policy learning, which may be functional or dys-
functional, is to recognize how these two realities intertwine to produce action and
practices at any given moment.
These are still abstract notions for micro-foundations—although not more
abstract than the micro-foundations of other frameworks—and remember what we
said about assumptions in analytical frameworks: they should not be judged by how
well they match reality. Anyhow, experimental studies provide supplementary
knowledge on how individuals learn. Essentially we have two micro-foundational
mechanisms for individual learning. One is inferential, in the sense of drawing infer-
ences by reasoning on what has happened. This reasoning has consequences for the
priors and leads to an updating of beliefs. The drawing-lessons operation can be cog-
nitive or emotional, correct or incorrect. But inference is fundamental; hence this is
inferential learning.
The other mechanism is called contingent learning (Kamkhaji & Radaelli, 2016).
It occurs under conditions of extreme surprise and uncertainty. In these conditions,
experimental studies have observed that individuals learn via fast-paced associa-
tions of cue-outcome dyads. Priors do not change, individuals do not choose behav-
ior on the basis of their understanding of cause-effect relations. They do not reason
inferentially on what has happened. Surprise throws in a set of unexpected cue–
outcome relations—decision makers are typically confronting these relations in
crisis-related episodes. It is exactly the lack of experience about the relationship
existing between a given stimulus and an outcome that triggers the mechanism.
This surprise about the causal relationship generates contingent learning. Once con-
tingent learning is triggered, feedback and the passing of time create the basis for
inferential learning, where individuals understand, decode, and learn inferentially
what they have done before in contingent fashion. Thus, under conditions of crisis
and extreme surprise, we have micro-foundations that illustrate the sequence
between contingent learning and inferential learning. This sequence has been suc-
cessfully probed in the context of the crisis of the Euro—showing that the findings
under carefully controlled experiments can also apply to the domain of public pol-
icy (Kamkhaji & Radaelli, 2016).
Logically Consistent Concepts and Clear Causal Drivers
Beyond clarity around its starting assumptions, an analytical framework must be
internally consistent and offer clear causal drivers (Sabatier, 1999, p. 8). We observe
two elements that ensure coherence. One is the fact that the concept of learning must
cover the full spectrum, from unlearning to zero learning to learning (Radaelli, 2009).
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This is a property that is fundamental to avoid bias in empirical analysis, where the
risk is one of censoring learning as a variable by looking only at its positive values.
The other is to allow learning to vary empirically from enlightenment to endarken-
ment (Weiss, 1977, 1979, and more recently Daviter, 2015). We shall go back to this
second element later on—we flag it now because it is fundamental for conceptual
consistency.
To explore in depth the conceptual and causal architecture of policy learning, we
need to go back to the four varieties of learning. The varieties are distinguished by:
knowledge use, the causal mechanisms that underpin that use, actors’ modes of
interaction, decision makers’ mode of attention, the benefits they bring when learn-
ing is functional, and the “pathologies” or degenerations that may result from poor
learning performances (see Table 1).
1. Epistemic learning takes place where knowledge is created around an issue with
low tractability by a certified set of experts. The archetypal actor is the expert,
or, collectively, the epistemic community with participatory or consultative
rights in policy processes where complexity has to be negotiated and ultimately
reduced. Epistemic actors occasionally enjoy direct policymaking responsibili-
ties, such as the Delors Committee that paved the way for the decision to create
the Euro (Verdun, 1999) or the European Central Bank in circumstances of radi-
cal uncertainty during the Euro crisis of 2010–2011. To use Weiss’s (1979)
famous typology, knowledge use is instrumental—the aim is for experts’ advice
to show up directly in policy development. Such impact is achieved by the close
relationship that can develop between decision makers and epistemic communi-
ties. Knowledge deficits on the part of decision makers ensures this mode of
interaction is necessarily asymmetrical, with decision makers effectively being
taught by the experts. For example, under conditions of radical uncertainty or
where a group of experts is particularly revered, decision makers’ attention is
Table 1. Unpacking Varieties of Learning
Learning as . . . Epistemic Reflexive Bargaining Hierarchical
Knowledge use as . . . instrumental conceptual political/
symbolic
imposed
Causal mechanism . . . expert teaching deliberation resource
competition
institutional rules
Interaction of policy
actors as . . .
cooperative
asymmetric
cooperative
symmetric
competitive
symmetric
competitive
asymmetric
Benefits as . . . clinching
what works
depth of debate
and breadth of
knowledge types
wide range of
evidence scanned
locks-in evidence
Pathologies as . . . groupthink uneven capacity
leads to
spurious
consensus
unstable outcomes
and expert
discrediting
or withdrawal
blocked
learning and
expert defeatism
Decision makers’
attention as . . .
directed diffuse/divided selective routinized
Mode underpinned
by a logic of . . .
rationality appropriateness consequence habit
Source: Dunlop, 2014 (Tables 1 and 2, pp. 212, 216).
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“directed” to what they say and can result in expert involvement in preference
formation (see Haas, 1990).
2. Reflexive learning occurs where uncertainty is at its highest—the issue lacks trac-
tability and there is no socially agreed set of actors who is certified as the
teacher. Instead, we have deliberation and contestation by a pluralist set of
actors. Accordingly, knowledge use is conceptual—there to fuel and then con-
solidate the results of a socially thick policy conversation. In such uncertain pol-
icy environments, outcomes are difficult to predict but exchanges are
cooperative. In its ideal form, this reflexive learning has Habermasian quali-
ties—where decision makers’ attention is diffused as they engage with a wide
range of actors and viewpoints. Policy learning occurs over time through com-
munication, preference change, and collective puzzling. Here, the technocratic
world of epistemic learning dominated by codified knowledge is replaced with
a wide range of knowledge types. Tacit, uncodified knowledge—such as myths
or innuendo—take their place alongside formal knowledge in informing and
changing beliefs about the appropriate form of policy (Sanderson, 2002). In its
functional manifestations, we have the wisdom of crowds. Yet, the flip side of
this is the so-called myth of the best argument (Pellizoni, 2001), where incom-
mensurable paradigms should be acknowledged or else risk a fake consensus in
the name of the “best argument.”
3. Learning through bargaining captures situations where learning occurs as an unin-
tended, but nonetheless potent, by-product of interest-driven stakeholders.
Where actor certification and uncertainty are both low, learning takes place
through competitive interactions of stakeholders who select evidence from a
range of “knowers” that suits their policy preferences. While knowledge use is
political or symbolic, policy-based evidence need not be a negative phenome-
non. The polyarchic nature of these interactions ensures that a wide range of
evidence may be aired in policy debates. Moreover, the stability generated by
processes of partisan mutual adjustment (Lindblom, 1965) may ensure that
some lessons hold for long periods. Yet, where evidence is judged to have been
manipulated to secure policy preferences, learning through bargaining may
degenerate resulting in a retreat of and from ideas.
4. Learning in the shadow of hierarchy occurs in hierarchical contexts where authori-
ties use the vertical organization of policymaking to force knowledge use. Such
imposition (captured in Weiss’s later work—Weiss, Murphy-Brown, & Birke-
land, 2005) is a result of circumstances where learning is structured by vertical
institutional rules, for example rules that discipline budget constraints within
which social policy can be made, or rules about intergovernmental relations.
Interactions here are governed by a habitual logic (Hopf, 2010). Institutions use
their mandates to steer learning from the “top” (Radaelli, 2008) in ways that
minimize negotiations and exceptions to the rules. Learning becomes an exer-
cise in gathering information centrally, and translating and disseminating it via
instructions supported by incentives and sanctions. For the recipients at the
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bottom, learning is about understanding what is expected from them, the nature
of instructions, and the forms of compliance. Thus, there is learning about com-
pliance on a substantive topic, and meta-learning about understanding the ecol-
ogy of rules and how the authorities expect the recipients to use them.
To investigate the causal architecture further, Dunlop and Radaelli (2013, pp. 604–
613) expand the property space of each of our four learning types with a theory of
adult learning that differentiates between situations where learners focus on the sub-
stance or goal of knowledge creation and communication. High or low focus over
what we learn and why results in four adult learning types: self-directed learning,
informal learning, non-formal learning, and formal learning (Mocker & Spear, 1982;
see Figure 2). These types are constructed on empirical reality and assumptions of
intended rationality. In line with the framework construction outlined already, this
yields an account of learning dynamics which are objectively probable and involve a
low degree of abstraction. We end up with four roles for each cell of the basic model
of Figure 1. Thus, in total the literature can be mapped out in 16 learning modes
from the original four (Figure 3).
At any one time, we expect that a learning mode will dominate policymaking
around an issue. As noted earlier, the mode that matters is contingent upon the state
of our two dimensions. Changes in issue tractability and/or actor certification will
trigger moves within and between learning types. The conditions are not simply set
objective realities that exist “out there.” Rather, they are constructed by decision
makers in government who steer governance on the basis of exogenous conditions—
economic performance, legal protocols, political power shifts—or endogenous devel-
opments—most notably learning and unlearning by policy actors.
In terms of applicability, there is no one-to-one necessary correspondence
between learning and a given stage of the policy process. While it is likely that epi-
stemic learning may be confined to the issue framing stages—where uncertainty is at
its peak—the model does not set this restriction. There is no conceptual reason that
Self-Directed Learning Informal Learning 
Non-Formal Learning Formal Learning 
LEARNERS’ FOCUS ON LEARNING OBJECTIVES / ENDS 
LOW HIGH 
HIGH 
LEARNERS’ 
FOCUS ON 
LEARNING 
CONTENT / 
MEANS 
LOW 
Figure 2. Mocker and Spear’s Lifelong Learning Typology.
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the epistemic mode cannot characterize implementation, though empirically this
may be less likely than agenda-setting. In common with most policy frameworks, we
assume liberal democratic politics with a civil society infrastructure. With that in
place, the framework does not favor any particular political system over another.
To wrap up, we have demonstrated learning as an analytical framework is
anchored to a set of coherent concepts and a causal architecture based on explana-
tory typologies. The learning approach we have described mitigates bias by allowing
all values of the variables, without censoring some. Further, the explanatory typol-
ogy is grounded in robust theories: adult education and policy theory. The 16-role
expansion shows the connections between different types, and identifies the drivers
that take us from one cell in Figure 3 to the others. To see whether all this amounts
to explanatory leverage, we now move to the next section.
Implications and Empirical Testing
Learning can assist researchers in the field in three ways that relate to observable
implications, but with different features.
The first pathway is observable implications that contribute to existing frame-
works on the policy process. To illustrate: the varieties of learning framework can
feed into the development of the narrative policy framework by putting forward
propositions like “if learning is of type X, then narratives and narrators will have
these observable characteristics Y1 and Y2.” By way of exemplification, in Table 2, we
portray the observable implications of learning types for a few of the key variables
that define the focus of the narrative policy framework (NPF). This is just a sug-
gested formulation of observable implications for the NPF. Others can be added—for
example on the features of the causal plot, with epistemic-led narrative plot
anchored to the authority of science and evidence whilst a hierarchical causal plot
will emphasize law, formal authority, and due procedure.
Deliberative Experimental Intelligence of 
Democracy 
Learning via 
Conditionality 
Framing as 
Learning 
Evolutionary Strategic Loosely-
Coupled 
Agent / 
Contributor 
Producer of 
Standards 
Autonomy Instrumental 
Facilitator Expert as 
Teacher 
Delegation Hetero-Directed 
Reflexive 
Hierarchy Epistemic 
Bargaining LOW
LOW HIGH 
HIGH 
CERTIFICATION 
OF ACTORS
PROBLEM TRACTABILITY 
Figure 3. Expanding Modes of Policy Learning.
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We can do the same for the advocacy coalition framework (ACF)—one of the
most established and tested frameworks. The ACF assists the development of
observable implications for the learning framework as much as the latter enriches
the ACF. The ACF central questions relate to the varieties of learning. When does
policy learning (or policy-oriented learning to use ACF language) lead to policy
change? What is it that changes? Three features of the policy subsystem matter in
explaining the context and events that foster learning: the nature of professional fora,
level of conflict, and the analytical tractability of the issue (Jenkins-Smith, 1990,
pp. 95–103; Sabatier, 1987, pp. 678–681; Weible & Nohrstedt, 2013, pp. 130–131). These
characteristics affect the object of learning—i.e., the likelihood that policy core or sec-
ondary beliefs will be altered. We now relate these conditions to the varieties of
learning.
In his discussion of professional fora, Jenkins-Smith (1990, pp. 99–103) empha-
sizes the imprint left by the level of conflict, analytical tractability, and type of forum
on the use of analysis. A focus on learning types extends this type of reasoning to
capture the wider effects of social science utilization. Let us see how, starting from
the type of forum. Since the forum disciplines participation, we can have an open
forum, a professionalized forum, or a closed forum. Professionalized settings are
characterized by shared analytical training and norms. Consequently, access to
debate is screened. The likelihood of using social sciences to learn is high. A profes-
sionalized forum matches epistemic learning environments. Hierarchical settings dis-
cipline access by drawing on formal rules (of representation, for example) and levels
of governance. Professionalized fora can facilitate learning by providing know how
Table 2. Varieties of Learning: Observable Implications for the Narrative Policy Framework
NPF
Categories Epistemic Reflexive Bargaining Hierarchical
Narrator is defined
on the basis of
her . . .
knowledge argument and
ethics
resources formal authority
Decision maker is
. . .
teacher maieutic agent facilitator of
exchanges
interpreter and
developer of
formal rules
Policy problems
are narratively
represented as
. . .
information and
know-how
problems
mutual
obligations
benefit-cost
issues
procedures and
targets
Drama and
metaphors
emphasizing the
value of research
and knowledge
pushing toward
mutual
understanding
and collective
binding
magnifying
advantages from
social exchange
illustrating
consequences of
compliance and
lack thereof
Heroes and
villains
heroes proceed via
enlightenment
heroes respect
social norms
villains are those
who do not sit
at the table and
do not accept to
negotiate
embedded in
conceptions of
compliance with
rules
Doomsday
scenarios explain
the consequences
of . . .
acting in irrational
ways
rejecting a
community based
on deliberation
and common fate
following
short-term
interests
lack of compliance,
sanctions, and
punishment
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in relation to clearly specified goals and targets. Learning is more exploratory in
reflexivity mode, where professionalized fora do not necessarily have a pivotal posi-
tion. Quite the contrary, they may be marginalized because professional and lay
knowledge have the same value. In bargaining, professionalized fora are captured
by partisan mutual adjustment—they can be instrumental and effective if they accept
to become a component of the advocacy game.
The second condition concerns the level of conflict between actors in learning
modes (Jenkins-Smith, 1990, pp. 95–97; Weible, 2008). Learning is frustrated where
conflict is very low—hierarchical settings—and the incentives to update policy core
and deep beliefs are absent. Conversely, in reflexive settings conflict is transparent
but can be extreme. Reflexivity makes the assumption that communicative rationality
assists one coalition in overcoming defensive positions and in accepting to hear the
argument of the other coalition. Whether policy processes approximate these ideal-
speech situations is another story. This is why in ACF analysis, the learning “sweet
spot” is found where there are intermediate levels of conflict—settings where “there
is enough of a threat to attract the attention of rivals but not too much of a threat to
entrench opponents on rigid policy positions” (Weible & Nohrstedt, 2013, p. 131).
Learning through bargaining and in epistemic mode best fit this description.
Finally, ACF analysis treats learning as conditioned by the level of analytical
tractability of an issue (Jenkins-Smith, 1990, pp. 97–99)—we have already discussed
this variable when we presented Dunlop and Radaelli (2013).
Varieties of learning assists the ACF in qualifying the types of learning, and
within each type, the causal mechanisms that drive learning. It also allows for more
endogenous forms of learning within and across coalitions (especially in the reflexive
and bargaining modes), whereas the ACF is more powerful in explaining learning
triggered by variables that are exogenous to the policy-subsystem.
The second pathway is about observable implications for learning as a depen-
dent variable. In the analytical framework we presented, the value of two variables
(problem tractability and certification of actors) will determine the prevailing learn-
ing type and the associated style of interaction between policy actors (e.g., partisan
mutual adjustment or communicative rationality, rule and procedure-driven or
evidence-based driven), the nature of policy fora (idea-labs, arenas, participatory
venues, or consultation and advice bodies established by law and parliamentary pro-
cedure), and so on. As outlined, it also predicts each of the 16 roles on the basis of
two additional variables—control of learning content and learning objectives (as in
Figure 3). Further, we have implications from micro-foundational studies. Under
conditions of extreme surprise, we should observe contingent learning first, followed
by inferential learning. This is a proposition that can be tested in cases of acute crisis,
and more precisely in intra-crisis periods (Kamkhaji & Radaelli, 2016), and crisis
management capacity-building (e.g., Schwarzer, 2015).
Additionally, authors like Boswell (2008) have put forward propositions about
how organizations use the knowledge they have learned, depending on the features
of the policy area (namely, the acknowledgement, in a given policy domain, of epi-
stemic uncertainty versus the acceptance of technical, science, and evidence-based
modes of settlement) and the type of organization. Most interestingly perhaps,
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Boswell argues that an organization that does not control its output will use knowl-
edge to legitimize policy. Organizations like the European Commission, which
depends on the bureaucracy of the member states of the European Union for imple-
mentation and ultimately output, will exhibit more legitimizing than instrumental
usages. These types of propositions can be tested across a large number of policy sec-
tors and types of organizations. They also invite more integration between policy
learning and two research fields we do not cover in this paper, but have many points
of contact: ideational politics and knowledge utilization (Freeman & Sturdy, 2014;
Radaelli, 1995).
Turning to the third pathway, we look at observable implications of the type “if
this learning occurs . . . then we should observe this effect on the dependent varia-
ble.” The classic dependent variable for learning, but also for other frameworks, is
policy change. Actually the relationship between learning and change is qualified.
An individual can learn without necessarily being able to bring about change within
an organization. A single organization can learn but change may not materialize
because of institutional inertia, complexity, veto players, and other factors. A whole
system may learn without having the necessary capacity to change.
Add that change has different properties depending on the variety of learning
we take into account. Under “bargaining” change will take the form of an agreement
or compromise among the actors interested. Whether this necessarily leads to major
policy change is an open question. It depends on resources, capacity, de-coupling
between the compromise and the actions, and so on. The old argument that many
incremental changes make a big change applies. In “epistemic” types change will
involve an alteration of priors on the basis of evidence. Yet again, this may or may
not trigger change. Certainly epistemic networks have generated changes in domains
like climate change, international tax evasion, and poverty—yet the degrees of imple-
mentation we have seen in these three international policy domains vary markedly.
In “reflexivity,” we find the mechanism for major policy change. Actually
authors working on experimental learning (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008) and social learning
(Hall, 1993) point to the inclusive properties of this mode to draw conclusions about
societal-level change—or at least major paradigmatic changes in a policy field (like
macro-economic and monetary policy for Hall, or sectors like energy and employ-
ment for Sabel & Zeitlin). Some of these propositions about the effects of reflexivity
have now been tested across sectors with corroborating evidence (Sabel & Zeitlin,
2012; Zeitlin, 2015).
For “hierarchy” we have a full set of propositions concerning coordinated action
in certain types of multi-level governance settings, like the ones dominating the
European Union and German federalism. Fritz Scharpf has generated a causal model
of how joint-decision systems hinder policy change. Take a multi-level governance
system where some decisions are taken at the higher federal level. When these deci-
sions are taken by the participating actors (goverments in the EU, L€ander in German
federal decisions) without a principle of representation that filters out the immediate
interests of the lower units and there is a formal or informal unanimity rule, then
decisions are suboptimal. Policies that are already in place are hard to reverse, and
new decisions cannot be taken at the federal level—whilst the lower units have lost
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competence for these decisions. This is the joint-decision trap. Recent work, however,
has shown how the joint-decision trap can be relaxed (Falkner, 2011). In a revealing
footnote in one of his joint-decision trap articles, Scharpf remarks about the differ-
ence between his Coasian approach and spatial voting theory. He observes that the
Coasian theory he adopts includes policy learning: “spatial voting theory, in contrast,
ignores the possibility of policy learning and takes fixed preferences over strategies”
(Scharpf, 2006, p. 850, footnote 4, note that here Scharpf uses “strategies” as proxy
for “policies”).
The joint-decision trap would take us into a long discussion. All we can say
here is that joint-decision traps, and escape routes from them, are intimately con-
nected to learning processes, although the explicit derivation of observable
implications of learning for change is rare in extant literature.1 Essentially, some
forms of hierarchical learning can be compatible with rational choice institution-
alism and can explain how actors find escape routes from joint-decision traps.
Other types of learning are obviously empirically possible, and grant additional
ways to escape traps. However they are not compatible with the assumptions of
rational choice institutionalism and should not be considered “extensions” of
Scharpf’s model. Simply, they belong to other types of explanations. This leads
us to an important corollary: there is an affinity between rational choice institu-
tionalism and two varieties of learning—bargaining and hierarchy—whilst epi-
stemic and reflexive learning lend themselves quite naturally to sociological
institutionalism and constructivism.
To sum up, learning has developed observable implications that add to existing
frameworks on the policy process. It has also provided testable propositions about
how to identify one type of learning or another, or sequences of learning. Here, how-
ever, the literature has just begun to operationalize concepts, hence measurement is
a challenge. When we turn to learning as an independent variable, we have conjec-
tures about when we should expect or not expect policy change, and its causal driv-
ers under different modes of learning. Yet again, the literature is somewhat under-
developed here.
Normative Dimensions—Connecting Learning to Democracy
As well as offering a positive theory explaining large elements of the policy pro-
cess, claims for “promising” framework status are greatly enhanced by those
approaches that contain normative elements (Sabatier, 1999, p. 8; 2007, p. 8). The
assumption that learning is a “good thing” is implicit in much of the literature. But
as mentioned, learning is not always desirable. We can think of individuals and
organizations learning something that is dysfunctional and/or normatively unac-
ceptable in terms of democratic accountability or legitimacy. That said, the frame-
work is not normative in the tradition of social constructivism of Schneider and
Ingram (1997), for example. Yet, a non-normative framework can still have prescrip-
tive implications. Indeed, deLeon and Weible (2010) outline no fewer than six path-
ways to link policy process research with the improved democratic practices so
passionately argued for by Lasswell (1951). The first three are what they term as the
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“oversubscribed” strategies used by policy theorists to make their work relevant
beyond academia. We relate them to the varieties of learning framework in turn.
1. Reliance on the policy implications that can be drawn from policy research
(deLeon & Weible, 2010, pp. 25–26) is the prescriptive dimension most con-
nected to varieties of learning, thus far. Using the concepts of functional and
dysfunctional policy learning, the framework has been extended to identify
the conditions for efficient learning in each of the four modes. Here the pre-
scriptive reasoning is confined to the logic of the framework itself. Table 1
outlines the scope conditions for dysfunctional and efficient learning. One of
the advantages of these underpinnings is that it lends greater precision to
our reasoning. Recall deLeon and Weible (2010) chide researchers for being
too ambiguous in the policy implications they often draw (pp. 25–26). This
has been empirically explored in two empirical cases—the policy failure of
bovine tuberculosis in England (Dunlop, 2017b) and the crisis of sovereign
debt in the Eurozone (Dunlop & Radaelli, 2016). Both cases demonstrate that
actors and institutions learn how not to comply. They also learn how to get
trapped in their habits (heuristics) and competences, or learn “bad lessons.”
Taking the Euro example, Dunlop and Radaelli (2016) draw on varieties of
learning to explore design, and precisely how the institutions and policy
instruments of the European Union should be designed to generate socially
inclusive, legitimate, and accountable learning. Or, put differently, if an
organization is not learning in the right mode, we can identify what design
features would make it learn in a more desirable mode.
2. Reliance on normative theories embedded in policy theories (deLeon & Weible,
2010, pp. 26–27) is the second oversubscribed strategy for connecting with
democracy. That is not the case for this approach. Indeed, it is one of the varie-
ties of learning framework’s biggest areas of developmental need. That learning
can be concentrated in one mode or is not necessarily efficient or normatively
desirable raises issues of legitimacy and accountability. Learning modes gener-
ate power shifts. Take for example the scenario where learning is limited to the
epistemic realm. This may lead to more than the dysfunctional groupthink to
technocratic domination—bolting on ideas from normative political theory may
help us determine whether we can consider this rule without justification or
legitimate and accountable.
3. Reliance on political advocacy directed by our frameworks (deLeon & Weible,
2010, pp. 27–28). Outlining the conditions for functionality and dysfunctionality
of learning offers inspiration to actors seeking an advocacy role by making their
policy engagement more fruitful. A recent application of this has been made to
the world of experts. Using the varieties of the learning framework to outline
the probable worlds of policy learning scientific advisers can inhabit, Dunlop
(2014) then extends the framework using knowledge utilization literature to
postulate the types of “possible” expert personae that are required to function
and flourish in each learning mode. Policy experts or “issue advocates”
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(Jenkins-Smith, 1990) can achieve more effective engagement and impact by
adopting a mode of engagement to match the learning setting they find them-
selves in (Dunlop, 2014).
In sum, while we appear some way off from a policy learning sciences of democracy,
we have identified some promising beginnings. One final element to consider: varie-
ties of learning includes four types and 16 subtypes. In some of the 16 cells, the
reflection on the normative implications has already been deep. Think for example
of the field of experimental governance (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008), where the key authors
are engaged in a conversation with constitutionalism and democratic theory (Cohen
& Sabel, 1997)—to the point that experimentalism is seen as an embodiment of a
new form of democratic governance.
Conclusions
We have appraised the field of policy learning as a promising analytical frame-
work of the policy process. It is useful to repeat that we have chosen to focus on the
varieties of the learning approach not because it is better than others, but because it
allows us to treat in a single analytical template a vast portion of the field, as shown
by its assemblage of four types and 16 subtypes.
So, does policy learning meet the standards of an analytical framework? We
have considered assumptions and micro-foundations, the conceptual apparatus,
observable implications, and the normative usages. Our analysis shows that policy
learning meets these standards, although with variation. We point to specific
research questions where research should be intensified. More work has been done
on assumptions and concepts, less on normative appraisal. On observable implica-
tions we have cumulated more findings and causal relationships on learning as a
dependent variable than on learning as an independent variable.
In fact, there are several conjectures about why and how learning as an indepen-
dent variable can affect or hinder change, but we need to improve on operationaliza-
tions and measures that allow researchers to go confidently in the field. We have a
set of conjectures waiting for confutation or corroboration. In short, there is a lot of
work in progress. The same can be said of normative analysis.
One point we wish to make is that policy learning is not stuck to where we were
in the 1990s. It is a progressive research agenda, with solid ontological assumptions,
where new conjectures and causal relations have been theorized and are beginning
to be tested. This progressive character of the agenda underpins the enthusiasm evi-
denced by so many special issues on learning produced in recent years. In a sense,
the field we have considered is both classic (as mentioned we can trace its origin
back to very classic, foundational articles) and able to attract new empirical and theo-
retical work. All this is a signal of vitality.
Certainly, the field has many limitations—the major is that after so many years
from the intuitions of Peter Hall (1993), Bennett and Howlett (1992), May (1992), we
are still struggling with the causal relation between learning and change. Possibly
what we are finding out in terms of micro-foundations and, turning to another
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dimension, the Coleman’s “bath-tub” structure of causality (Dunlop & Radaelli,
2017), will illuminate the way ahead. As mentioned, presumably more leverage will
need a closer integration among policy learning, ideational analysis, and knowledge
utilization (on the latter, see the attempts made by Schrefler, 2010, and Radaelli,
2009). We also have to be clearer on the causal relations leading to nonlearning,
endarkenment, and the pathology of learning—another area where there is a lot of
exciting, fresh work but not much cumulative empirical knowledge so far.
With all these limitations, we have the impression that policy learning fares rea-
sonably well as an analytical framework of the policy process. The next step is to
measure “how well” with a systematic comparison with other, more established,
frameworks.
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Note
Previous versions of this article were presented at the International Political Science Association (IPSA)
annual conference, Poznan, 23–28 July, 2016 and European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR)
annual conference, Prague, 7–10 September, 2016. We benefited from many colleagues’ insights and
extend particular thanks to Paul Cairney, Falk Daviter, Robert Hoppe, Hank Jenkins-Smith, Katharine
Rietig, Edella Schlager, Philipp Trein, ChrisWeible, and two anonymous referees. Much of the conceptual
work on policy learning was informed by the European Research Council project on Analysis of Learning
in Regulatory Governance (ALREG) (grant 230267). The usual disclaimer applies.
1. In Falkner’s edited collection on decision traps see chapter 10 on learning as pathway out of stalemate
(Alecu de Flers, Chappell, & M€uller, 2011), and in the concluding chapter Scharpf attends to (instru-
mental) policy learning in another of his illuminating footnotes (Falkner, 2011; Scharpf, 2011, p. 233,
footnote 18).
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